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Abstract - We have over the past three years been working 
on the feasibility of Opportunistic Cloud Services (OCS) for 
enterprises. OCS is about enterprises strategically contributing 
and utilizing spare IT resources as cloud services. One of the 
major challenges that such a platform faces is data security and 
trust management issues. This paper presents a trust 
management system for OCS platforms. It models the concept 
of trust and applies it to OCS platforms. The trust model and 
the trust management system are verified through the 
simulation of the computation of the trust values with 
Infrastructure as a Service, and Software as a Service, usage 
scenarios. 
Keywords: Opportunistic Cloud Services; Trust Management 
System; Trust Engineering; Pseudo Service Level Agreement 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This introductory section begins with the motivation for this 
study, and then is followed by the background for trust 
engineering efforts in cloud computing.  
A. Motivation for the Study 
We have over the past three years been working on the 
feasibility of Opportunistic Cloud Services (OCS) for 
enterprises [1] [2] [3]. We have been working on the feasibility 
of its successful implementation in terms of the technical 
feasibility, impact of public policy and regulations on its 
implementation [3] , and the development of suitable incentive 
mechanisms for OCS networks [2]. We have also been working 
on the role of cloud computing for Information Technology (IT) 
resource cost management for SMEs [4], and how to leverage 
opportunistic cloud services to lighten the IT resource needs of 
SMEs, particularly in developing economies. 
One of the major challenges that such a platform faces is 
data security and trust management issues. The OCS network 
platform is a governing platform that serves as the social 
networking platform for enterprises and also includes 
interoperable cloud management tools with which member 
enterprises can provide resources that will be used by other 
enterprises interested in these services. Members normally will 
package only their spare IT resources and make them available 
as Cloud services on the OCS platform so that others interested 
can utilize them. For example a member institution that has 
virtualized its data center into a private cloud can plan its 
resources such that it can make some of these resources 
available to the OCS platform.  
Since no business agreement and hence no Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) exist between the service providers and the 
potential users of their services, service consumers do not enjoy 
the level of support (in terms of quality of service, reliability, 
availability, security, billing transparency, etc.) that commercial 
cloud service providers offer to their clients. Considering the 
fact that commercial cloud service providers are finding it 
extremely challenging to provide such a support, together with 
providing adequate transparency in their services to their clients 
with the hope of establishing the necessary trust, the OCS 
platform more so needs a well-crafted and soundly engineered 
trust management system in order to make resources on the 
platform suitable for business use.  
B. Trust Engineering in Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is essentially the packaging of traditional 
information technology infrastructure and software solutions 
such as storage, CPU, network,  applications, services, etc. as 
virtualized resources and delivered by a service provider to its 
customers as an on-demand pay-per-use self-provisioned 
service; normally offered through a web portal over a network 
such as the Internet [5] [6] [7]. As vendors start to deploy 
Cloud services, and users upload data in the Cloud to utilize 
them, a new privacy concern arises, because data owners would 
like to preserve the confidentiality of their data, and under 
some circumstance even their identities private from the 
software provider. While cloud service providers pledge to 
preserve data privacy, the current Software as a Service (SaaS) 
architecture makes it difficult to provide any assurance that the 
software in the Cloud will not be able to make copies or 
redistribute the data it used [8] . The Cloud model is based on 
two key characteristics: multi-tenancy, where multiple tenants 
share the same service instance, and elasticity, where tenants 
can scale the amount of their allocated resources based on 
current demands. Although both characteristics target 
improving resource utilization, cost and service availability, 
these gains are threatened by multi-tenancy security 
implications. The sharing of applications that process critical 
information without sufficient proven security isolation, 
security SLAs or tenant control, results in “loss-of-control” and 
“lack-of-trust” problems [9].  
Apart from these consumer concerns, cloud architectures 
also introduce new classes of security risks and attacks over the 
resources of cloud service providers. These include poisoned 
virtual machines, attacks against the Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP) management console, attacks based on knowledge of 
default security settings, abuse of billing systems, attacks that 
abuse the trust associated with the CSP’s namespace, and data 
leakage via uniform resource locators. Currently, CSPs do not 
have robust technical solutions that can protect their cloud 
resources from harmful malware, virus infection, botnets, 
distributed denial of service attacks, or other types of cyber-
attacks. Furthermore, there is no effective mechanism to help 
cloud users evaluate the security measures of their service 
providers and ensure the protection of their data while taking 
into consideration industry standards or personal preferences 
[9]. 
In order to design and develop a trust management system 
for the OCS platform, we needed to look at the current trust 
engineering issues in cloud computing. It was decided that we 
needed to perform a systematic literature review on this topic 
because since the OCS concept itself is new, any trust design 
models of its subsystems must be based on and guided by 
exhaustive knowledge of the state-of-the-art in the field. Some 
of the main findings of the study are that, employing trusted 
computing technologies and reputation based approaches are 
two key approaches to trust engineering in the cloud computing 
marketplace. Also, trusted third party approaches and the 
deployment model play a significant part in enhancing trust 
between service providers and their consumers. Based on the 
findings during the study, the main areas of trust engineering 
research focus has been on quality of service, security, access 
and identity management, user support on trust management, 
and accountability in in the context of a cloud computing 
marketplace . Though the objective of [10] is a formal trust 
specification which covers a wide range of intuitive trust 
characteristics such as trust transitivity and mutual relationship, 
much work has not been in this area of formal trust modeling. 
According to[11], discussions about cloud computing security 
often fail to distinguish general issues from cloud-specific 
issues. A similar trend is seen in the discussion of trust in cloud 
computing and trust engineering in general where the concept 
of trust in treated loosely without any formal specification or 
definition in its treatment. Formal trust modeling and 
definitions are however very necessary in ensuring a unified 
view of the concept of trust in the design and engineering of 
trust management systems for cloud computing. As a first step 
towards addressing this problem, we contextualized the formal 
trust specification of multi-agent environments for cloud 
computing environments, and provided a formal definition of 
the concept of trust as is applicable to the cloud computing 
marketplace. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
models the concept of trust for OCS platforms. Section III 
presents the design of a trust management system for OCS 
platforms. This is followed with the OCS trust management 
architecture in Section IV. Section V presents work on the 
verification of the trust model and the designed trust 
management system. Section VI concludes the paper and also 
touches on some insights on future work. 
II. TRUST MODEL FOR OCS PLATFORMS 
Opportunistic Cloud Services (OCS) is a social network 
approach to the provisioning and management of cloud 
computing services for enterprises; it deals with the concept of 
enterprises taking advantage of cloud computing services to 
meet their business needs without having to pay or paying a 
minimal fee for the services. The OCS network is modelled and 
implemented as a social network of enterprises collaborating 
strategically for the contribution and usage of cloud computing 
services without entering into any business agreements. 
1) Nature of Members and Services 
An OCS network consists of a set of strategic members 
contributing and utilizing cloud computing services. The 
platform consists of a set of services each belonging to a 
category; each service has a non-monetary cost that varies 
dynamically. The service or resource contributed by a member 
is of a certain finite capacity and the resources to a particular 
service may be contributed by multiple members. Members 
will normally only contribute resources that they have spare 
capacity of (e.g. CPU, storage, application that they have 
developed internally, etc.). That is, they package their spare IT 
resources as cloud services and make them available to the 
OCS platform. Members are free to provide and discontinue 
one or more services at will at any point in time. They are 
likewise free to use or discontinue the usage of one or more 
services at will at any point in time [2]. 
2) Trust Model in the context of OCS 
Though there has been some work on trust modeling and 
trust management systems, and even in the new domain of trust 
management systems for cloud computing environments [12] 
[13] [14], the subjective nature of trust has made a solid 
definition elusive. Researchers have most often used the term 
loosely in their work; more specifically, a rigorous formal 
definition has not been applied in most cases. 
The adopted definition and model of the concept of trust in 
this work is an adaptation of [15]: The level of trust, ( )pc iT t of a 
service consumer c for a service provider p  in the context of a 
transaction it T∈ is the a priori probability that the utility of c
will meet or exceed its minimum threshold of satisfaction 0u at 
the end of transaction it , given c ’s perceived trustworthiness of 
service provider p . Simply stated, trust is the level of 
confidence of c that the outcome of a transaction with another 
agent p  will be satisfactory for it. More formally:  
( ) ( )
( ) 0
, .
c
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c i c i
U R u
T t R t dRτ
≥
= ∫ , where ( )cU R  is the utility 
function of service consumer c ; and ( ),pc iR tτ - the 
trustworthiness of service provider p  as perceived by 
consumer c  in the context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori 
subjective joint probability distribution function of the critical 
rating vector ( )pc iR t  from the perspective of c . This definition 
and model of trust has been adopted by this paper because it 
provides this formal specification which is necessary in 
ensuring a unified view of the concept of trust in the design and 
engineering of trust management systems for cloud computing. 
It is not only cloud service consumers that need the 
consideration of trust in their transactions with the cloud 
service providers. Most often than not, cloud services providers 
also need to be wary of the activities of cloud service 
consumers. Thus, trust modeling is useful in the analysis of the 
genuine and potentially malicious service consumers. 
Therefore a trust model is needful for the perceived 
trustworthiness of service consumers by the providers of the 
services. So similarly, the level of trust ( )cp iT t of a service 
provider p for a service consumer c  in the context of a 
transaction it T∈ is the a priori probability that the utility of p
will meet or exceed its minimum threshold of satisfaction 0u at 
the end of transaction it , given service provider p ’s perceived 
trustworthiness of service consumer c . Again, more formally: 
( ) ( )
( ) 0
, .
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U R u
T t R t dRτ
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= ∫ , where ( )pU R  is the utility 
function of service provider p ; and ( ),cp iR tτ - the 
trustworthiness of service consumer c  as perceived by service 
provider p  in the context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori 
subjective joint probability distribution function of the critical 
rating vector ( )cp iR t  from the perspective of p . Please note 
that it is for notational simplicity that the critical rating vectors 
( )pc iR t  and ( )cp iR t are denoted by R (without the full 
complement of the subscripts) in the denotation of the 
trustworthiness. 
The above definitions have a number of interesting 
properties which correspond with the intuitive properties of 
trust in our everyday life such as trustworthiness is subjective, 
and it is defined relative to a particular set of critical attributes; 
trustworthiness is defined at a given point in time, and it is 
defined as a probability distribution. Some other important 
intuitive attributes of trust are that trust has duality - it is 
subjective and objective; that is some of the critical attributes 
are subjectively measureable and others are objectively 
measureable; trust is not always symmetrical, that is, A trusts 
B,  does not always mean B trusts A; and trust is dynamic, that 
is, trust is related to context and temporal factors [16]. 
We now consider the level of trust in a service - this time 
not the service providers but rather the services themselves. 
Since a particular service may come into fruition as a 
combination of resources and services from multiple providers, 
each service’s trust level must be assessed as an autonomous 
entity even though this trust level is a function of the composite 
trust level of the providers and the base services from which it 
has been derived.  So we define the trust level of a service s  
as:  
The level of trust ( )sc iT t of a service consumer c in a 
service s in the context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori 
probability that the utility of c will meet or exceed its 
minimum threshold of satisfaction 0u at the end of transaction
it , given 'c s perceived trustworthiness of service s . 
 ( ) ( )
( ) 0
, .
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c i c i
U R u
T t R t dRτ
≥
= ∫ , where ( )cU R  is the utility 
function of service consumer c ; and ( ),sc iR tτ - the 
trustworthiness of service s  as perceived by consumer c  in the 
context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori subjective joint 
probability distribution function of the critical rating vector 
( )sc iR t  from the perspective of c . 
The application of this trust modeling for the OCS platform 
and its usage will be demonstrated in Sections IV and V which 
respectively discuss the components of the OCS trust 
management architecture, and the OCS trust model verification 
by demonstrating how it is applied to an IaaS and SaaS usage 
scenarios. 
C. Trust Production Approaches 
There are generally three basic ways by which communities 
of interacting entities go about the issue of trust generation. 
These are: norms backed up by institutional guarantees, 
indirect cues, and reputational information [15]. Norms and 
institutional guarantees attempt to reduce the uncertainty on 
the behavior of other agents by prescribing specific allowed 
behavioral ranges (which usually correspond to satisfactory 
outcomes for the majority of transaction types and society 
members) and by providing institutions, which prevent 
deviations or make such deviations highly unlikely because of 
quick detection and effective sanctions [17]. Indirect cues are 
attributes of an agent, which we have associated with certain 
likely behaviors based on our experience, intuition and training. 
Reputational information is information about, or observations 
of an agent’s past behavior on similar situations that is 
aggregated and distributed by means of word-of-mouth or 
through trusted third parties, such as credit rating agencies, 
consumer reports, etc. Reputational information can help 
agents construct estimates on another agent’s trustworthiness 
under the assumption that agents have an underlying 
distribution of behavior, which is relatively stable over 
time[15]. 
Trust production through indirect cues is however 
inapplicable in online communities because this is mostly 
obtained by interacting agents through observing the body 
language and appearance of the other party they are transacting 
with. The application of institutional guarantees is also 
normally infeasible in cyberspace because of the anonymity 
enjoyed by the interacting entities and the lack of appropriate 
institutions or their inability to enforce adequate guarantees. 
However, findings from our previous work has shown that the 
major approaches to trust engineering in cloud computing are 
that, employing trusted computing technologies and reputation 
based approaches are two key approaches to trust engineering 
in the cloud computing marketplace. Also trusted third party 
approaches and the deployment model play a significant part in 
enhancing trust between service providers and their consumers. 
In the context of trust engineering for OCS environments, two 
of these come handy. These are the trusted third party based 
and the reputation based approaches.     
1) Trusted Third Party Based 
The OCS platform by its very nature can serve as a trusted 
third party for enhancing trust between service contributors and 
the utilizers of these services by providing and enforcing OCS 
institutional guarantees for the allowed normal behavior on the 
platform. This could be achieved through for example 
standardized Pseudo SLA templates (see Section IV for the 
discussion on the implementation and management of the 
Pseudo SLA system and its associated templates), and the 
detection of problematic services, service providers, and 
service consumers. Appropriate actions can then be taken to 
subsequently penalize the offending entities. 
2) Reputation Based  
The platform also lends itself to the gathering, management, 
and analysis of reputation information about services, service 
providers and service consumers. This information can then be 
used in supporting entities on the platform in making decisions 
about the trustworthiness of other entities they are interested in 
transacting with. 
3) Trust Values 
The platform will provide the following trust values to its 
members in facilitating their decision making process. The trust 
values of interest are: trust value of a service or a resource, 
trust value of the service category to which the service/resource 
belongs, trust value of service/resource providers, composite 
trust value of the group to which service /resource provider 
belongs, and trust value of resource consumers. This list is 
however extensible as new needs concerning trust values arise. 
III. OCS TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Some of the desired properties of the OCS trust 
management system are reliability, robustness, scalability, and 
usability. The verification of the system in this work will 
however focus on its applicability and usability. Demonstration 
of the other desired properties will be part of our future work 
when the responsible components are fully implemented. 
A. Main Elements of trust management systems 
The generic operations of trust management include 
expectation, data monitoring, data management, analysis, and 
decision making. 
1) Expectation: 
This is a function of the service user’s requirement 
specification, and service provider’s declared intensions of 
supported quality of service. This is normally expressed in 
SLAs that the cloud service provider and their customers enter 
into. There is a need for expectation management from both 
ends to ensure smooth arbitration in case of any breaches in the 
agreement. Since no formal agreement exists between the 
service providers and the users of these services, this 
expectation management is expressed on the OCS platform as 
Pseudo SLA.  
We adapt some of the stages of the work of [18] on the 
usage of public SLA templates in cloud markets to develop the 
creation and usage of pseudo SLA templates for the OCS 
platform. The implementation and management of the pseudo 
SLA concept on the OCS platform is in three main parts: the 
creation of pseudo SLA templates for categories of services by 
the OCS platform, the pseudo SLA specification by service 
providers, and the quality requirement specification by 
potential service users.  These main parts are respectively 
outlined below. 
a) Existing OCS platform pseudo SLA templates 
i. Platform administrators create pseudo SLA (pSLA) 
templates for service categories and their sub-
categories. This normally will be based on the cloud 
service type such as IaaS, PaaS, SaaS, DaaS, etc.  
ii. Request SLAs (rSLAs) may be promoted to OCS 
pSLAs by the OCS platform administrators 
iii. Each pSLA is stored in the SLA repository. 
b) Service providers pseudo SLA specification 
The service providers’ declared intentions are 
specified in service SLAs. 
i. The service provider specifies the category of service 
(and may also specify some critical attribute values), 
and it is then presented with a list of existing pSLA 
templates that the OCS platform considers as suitable 
templates. 
ii. The service provider assigns the service to a pSLA 
template. 
iii. The service provider creates the service SLA (sSLA) 
for the service by accepting a presented pSLA 
template or modifying it to create the sSLA to meet 
the specification of this service. 
iv. The new service SLA (sSLA) is stored in the service 
SLA repository.  
c) Service users’ quality requirements specification 
i. A potential service user specifies the service category 
together with the values of some critical attributes of 
the potential service to use. 
ii. The user is presented with possible matching sSLAs 
from the service SLA repository. 
iii. The user may accept one of these sSLAs and proceed 
to use the service or create a request SLA (rSLA) 
based on one of the sSLAs to suit its usage 
requirements. 
iv. The new rSLA is stored in the request SLA repository 
which can be presented as an OCS pSLA template to 
service providers during the service SLA creation 
stage of the service creating process. 
 
Fig.1 shows the processes involved in the pseudo SLA 
implementation and management. 
2) Data Monitoring and Management 
The data monitoring and management is concerned with 
what kinds of data should be monitored and the associated cost 
of monitoring. It is therefore responsible for defining new trust 
data that need to be monitored on the OCS platform. The kind 
of data that should be monitored should facilitate the gathering 
of information for computing the necessary trust values. These 
are the trust value of services and the trust value of the service 
category to which they belong; trust value of service providers, 
trust value of service consumers, and the composite trust value 
of the group to which service providers belong. Examples of 
some of the data that needs to be monitored in the case of 
computing the trust values of services are: how long the service 
has been in operation, percentage service uptime, probability 
distribution of service failures, and user ratings of the service. 
Some of the important parameters that need monitoring in the 
case of service providers are: how long the provider has been 
providing services, the services that the provider has been 
providing, trust values of all the services the provider has been 
providing, and the probability distribution of the failure of its 
services. Some of the parameters of monitoring interest in 
computing trust value of service consumers are service usage 
patterns, and reports of malicious behavior.   
The data management also deals with defining data storage 
policies such as for example local storage of trust matrix by 
members, storage of member interactions by the OCS platform, 
the type of communication and exchange of information, and 
what type of data are to be exchanged.  
3) Data Analysis 
The data analysis is concerned with the computation of the 
requisite trust values based on the information from the 
expectation of consumers and providers of services. 
a) Cloud Computing Parameters of Trust 
When selecting a cloud service provider, multiple important 
parameters that are of relevance to the cloud service consumer 
need to be identified properly. Also, there is need for 
mechanisms to measure those parameters and aggregate these 
measurements based on the customers’ preference regarding 
the importance of the parameters[19]. References [20] and [19] 
have identified several of these parameters which have been 
categorized into quality of service related, security and privacy 
related, risk management related, and reputation related 
attributes. These parameters (attributes) are termed critical 
attributes; more formerly, a critical attribute of a service 
provider s , from the perspective of a service consumer c , in the 
context of a transaction it T∈ is an attribute whose value 
affects the utility of c and is contingent upon the behavior of s  
in the course of transaction it [15].   
b) Reputation System (computation of reputation)  
The trustworthiness, ( ),
p
c iR tτ (reputation, if trustworthiness is 
from only reputational information) of service provider p  as 
perceived by consumer c  in the context of a transaction it T∈
is the a priori subjective joint probability distribution function 
of the critical rating vector ( )pc iR t  from the perspective of c . 
Instead of a single value rating, we have rating of metrics of 
intent, integrity, capability and results of the critical attributes 
of the entity to be trusted, from which our model computes the 
trustworthiness; trust values are then computed from this. That 
is, for each critical attribute (e.g. accuracy, reliability, etc.) in 
the critical rating vector ( )pc iR t  that has been identified from 
the rSLA of the service consumer, the reputational ratings are 
based on the intent, integrity, capability and results; where 
intent constitutes information about declared agendas about 
what entities promise to provide through their services. 
Integrity constitutes information about honesty; this is a 
measure of, to what extent entities deliver on what they 
promised. Capability constitutes information about owned or 
outsourced resources (what assets parties have); and finally, 
results constitute information about products and services that 
entities specialized in through consistently delivering these 
products and services satisfactorily to their clients [21].    
4) Decision Support 
The purpose of the users of a trust management system is to 
make decisions concerning engaging in particular transaction at 
a point in time. It is imperative to provide an intuitive 
representation of trust values for all the types of users of the 
OCS platform. This will be handled by the Decision Support 
Manager as is discussed later in the next section. 
IV. OCS TRUST MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE 
The major components of the OCS trust management 
system are Expectation Manager (EM), Platform Guarantees 
Enforcement Manager (PGEM), Data Monitoring Manager 
(DMoM), Data Management Manager (DMaM), Trust Analysis 
Manage (TAM), and Decision Support Manager (DSM). Fig. 2 
shows the relationship between these components. 
A. Expectation Manager 
The expectation manager is responsible for handling the 
creation and maintenance of the OCS Platform pseudo SLA 
(pSLA) templates, the service provider assignment of services 
to a particular pSLA template, and the creation of service SLA 
(sSLA) to meet the specification of each service. It is also 
responsible for presenting potential service users with possible 
matching sSLAs from the service SLA repository which they 
may accept and proceed to use the service or create a request 
SLA (rSLA) based on one of the sSLAs to suit their specific 
usage requirements.  
Fig. 1: Processes involved in the pseudo SLA implementation and management 
 
 
B. Platform Guarantees Enforcement Manager 
This module is responsible for ensuring good and 
acceptable behavior on the platform. It applies appropriate 
sanctions to undesirable behaviors on the platform. It is 
therefore responsible for malicious conditions detection and the 
detection of SLA violation, and then taking appropriate 
remedial actions such as removing offending services from the 
platform and banning offending users.  
C. Data Monitoring Manager 
The DMoM is responsible for defining new trust data that 
needs to be monitored on the OCS platform in order to 
accommodate for adapting the platform to future needs such as 
when new service categories and categories of trust values are 
needed to be computed.  
D. Data Management Manager 
The data management manager is responsible with defining 
data storage policies such as for example local storage of trust 
matrix by members, storage of member interactions by the 
OCS platform, the type of communication and exchange of 
information, and what type of data are to be exchanged. It also 
deals with data reliability, security, recovery in case of 
problems and maintaining consistency in situations of 
discrepancies in data from multiple sources.   
E. Trust Analysis Manager 
This module makes the analyses of the trust values to be 
computed from information from the expectation manager and 
the available data from the data management module. It then 
computes the necessary trust values. It is evident from our 
model of the definition of trust on the OCS platform that we are 
interested in personalized trust values for the entities on the 
OCS platform. For example a potential service consumer will 
be interested in computing its perceived trust value for a 
service and its perceived trust value of the provider(s) of that 
service. This is achieved with equations (1) and (2), and the 
trust values computation algorithm as described below. 
The level of trust ( )pc iT t of a service consumer c for a 
service provider p  in the context of a transaction it T∈ is the 
a priori probability that the utility of c will meet or exceed its 
minimum threshold of satisfaction 0u at the end of transaction
it , given 'c s perceived trustworthiness of service provider p .  
( ) ( )
( ) 0
, .
c
p p
c i c i
U R u
T t R t dRτ
≥
= ∫ ,  ------- (1) where ( )cU R  is 
the utility function of service consumer c ; and ( ),pc iR tτ - the 
trustworthiness of service provider p  as perceived by 
consumer c  in the context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori 
subjective joint probability distribution function of the critical 
rating vector ( )pc iR t  from the perspective of c . 
The level of trust ( )sc iT t of a service consumer c for a 
service s in the context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori 
probability that the utility of c will meet or exceed its 
minimum threshold of satisfaction 0u at the end of transaction
it , given 'c s perceived trustworthiness of service s .  
( ) ( )
( ) 0
, .
c
s s
c i c i
U R u
T t R t dRτ
≥
= ∫ , ------- (2) where ( )cU R  is the 
utility function of service consumer c ; and ( ),sc iR tτ - the 
trustworthiness of service s  as perceived by consumer c  in the 
context of a transaction it T∈ is the a priori subjective joint 
probability distribution function of the critical rating vector 
( )sc iR t  from the perspective of c . 
1) Trust Values Computation Algorithm 
1. Identify service dependencies from rSLA 
2. Compute trust value of the service based on eq. (2) 
3. Compute trust value (based on eq. (1)) of each of the 
service providers contributing to this service 
4. Compute composite trust value, ( )compc iT t  based on  
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2
1 2
...
comp s p p
c i s c i p c i p c i
pn
pn c i
T t T t T t T t
T t
ω ω ω
ω
= + + +
+
     
1 2, ... 1s p p pnwhere ω ω ω ω+ + + =  
5. For each service dependencies in step 1, repeat steps 
2, 3 and 4 
6. Compute the overall composite trust value by applying 
the appropriate dependency level weight( lω ) based on 
the level of the dependency in the dependency chain 
for all composite trust values as in step 4  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 ...total comp comp compc i i i l l iT t T t T t T tω ω ω= + + + , 
where 1 2... 1lω ω ω+ + =  
To compute ( )compc iT t  from equations (1) and (2), we need 
the utility function ( )cU R , the critical rating vectors ( )pc iR t and 
( )sc iR t  , the weights( sω , pω and lω ) , and the trustworthiness 
(reputation) distribution functions ( ),pc iR tτ and ( ),sc iR tτ .  The 
critical rating vectors are internal properties of c  which is 
specified in or can be derived from its rSLA; and the utility 
function is also an internal property of c  which it can provide 
for the algorithm to compute the trust values. All the weights,
sω , pω and lω , are parameters that are determined by the OCS 
platform. The remaining required parameters are the reputation 
distribution functions; and these are also available from the 
data monitoring and data management modules on the OCS 
platform as reputation data. The only issue left is the need to 
convert the reputation data that have been collected into 
standardized probability distribution functions to simplify the 
trust value computations and provided tractable solutions.  
2) Approximation of reputation (trustworthiness) 
The approximation of the reputation data to standard known 
probability distribution functions (e.g. Uniform distribution, 
normal distribution, etc.), can be achieved using appropriate 
curve fitting algorithms. The reputation data gathered by the 
DMoM and DMaM modules can be approximated to standard 
probability distributions function using curve fitting algorithms 
such as polynomial (linear, quadratic, 3rd order, etc.), and 
logarithmic algorithms. 
F. Decision Support Manager 
The decision support manager is responsible for taking 
results from the trust value computations of the analysis 
manager and presenting it in a format that simplify 
visualization for the users. The user-friendly trust value 
representation together with making recommendations on 
decisions to be taken by users should facility their decision 
making process. 
 Fig. 2: OCS trust management systems architectural components 
 
V. OCS TRUST MODEL VERIFICATION  
Two usage scenarios are employed for demonstrating the 
applicability of the OCS trust model and the OCS trust 
management system. One of the usage scenarios will be on an 
IaaS and the other on SaaS. The verification process seeks to 
demonstrate the applicability of the trust model and trust 
management system to standard cloud computing services.   
A. IaaS usage scenario 
We look at the case where an OCS member has spare 
storage space at its data center and has virtualized this storage 
space to provide a storage service on the OCS platform. The 
standardized pSLA that may apply to such a service is show in 
table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: pSLA template for IaaS 
Attribute value types 
Service Identification Service ID & category ID 
Service Type / category IaaS & category ID 
Availability 50 % uptime 
Service support No 
Service support type N/A 
Maintenance notification Yes 
SLA dependencies {} 
Service location {} 
Security None 
Data encryption None 
Privacy None 
Certification {} 
1) sSLA created from a pSLA 
In this case, the service provider may for example, change 
only the availability level to 95%, and provide security support 
of data backup and recovery as shown in table 2. 
Table 2: sSLA created from a pSLA 
Attributes value types 
Service Identification Service ID & category ID 
Service Type / category IaaS & category ID 
Availability 95 % uptime 
Service support No 
Service support type N/A 
Maintenance notification Yes 
SLA dependencies {} 
Service location {} 
Security Data backup & recovery 
Data encryption None 
Privacy None 
Certification {} 
2) rSLA created from sSLA or pSLA 
A service user may accept this sSLA in order to use the 
service or request for additional requirements in its rSLA.   
3) Computation of trust values 
i. Extraction of critical rating vectors from the rSLA 
If the user in interested in service availability, 
security and maintenance notification as its criteria 
for using then service, then the critical rating 
vector is given by 
( ) { ,sec , }sc iR t availability urity maintenance notification=   
ii. Extraction of users’ utility function 
Assuming the user’s utility function increases 
monotonically with availability above 90% given that security 
and maintenance notification are provided, then the utility 
function is given by  
( ) 90%cU R ≥  
iii. Approximation of reputational information into 
standardize probability distribution functions 
We look at two cases, one in which the trustworthiness 
( ),sc iR tτ approximates a uniform distribution function, and the 
second approximates a normal distribution. The empirically 
collected data is approximated to standard distribution 
functions using appropriate curve fitting algorithms as 
mentioned in Section IV.E.2 above.  
We compute the trust level of the service when ( ),sc iR tτ  is 
a uniform distribution with parameters ( , )U a b  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 0.9
0.9
0.9, . 1 , . 1 ( )s s sc i c i c i
aT t R t dR R t dR
b a
τ τ
−∞
−= = − = − Φ
−∫ ∫  
a. We compute the trust level of the service when ( ),sc iR tτ  
is a normal distribution with parameters 
2
22
1 ( )( , ) *exp( )
2*2* *
xN
pi
μμ σ
σσ
− −=  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 0.9
0.9
0.9, . 1 , . 1 ( )s s sc i c i c i
uT t R t dR R t dRτ τ
σ−∞
−= = − = − Φ∫ ∫  
Fig. 3 shows the characteristic curves of the trust level 
against the lower limit in the above scenario when the upper 
limit of the availability is 100%. It shows for the uniform 
distribution and a normal distribution curve with standard 
deviations equal to that of the uniform distribution.  
 
 
Fig. 3: Trust Level against varying Lower limit of availability 
Similarly the trust level for the provider of the services is 
computed in the same way us above. Fig. 4 shows the 
composite trust level in our scenario with varying service 
weight, where the trust level of the service is from the uniform 
distribution as above and the trust level of the provider is the 
normal distribution with the same standard deviation as that of 
the uniform distribution. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Trust Level against varying service weight 
Fig. 5 show the composite trust level in our scenario with 
varying user utility, where the trust level of the service is from 
the uniform distribution as above and the trust level of the 
provider is the normal distribution with the same standard 
deviation as that of the uniform distribution. Fig.5a shows 
when the service and the service provider have equal weight of 
0.5 in the composite trust value, Fig.5b shows when the service 
has a weight of 1(provider has a weight of 0) in the composite 
trust value, and Fig.5c shows when the service has a weight of 
0 (provider has weight of 1) in the composite trust value. 
 
Fig. 5a: Trust level against varying user utility when the service and 
the service provider have equal weight of 0.5 in the composite trust 
value 
  
Fig. 5b: Trust level against varying user utility when the service has a 
weight of 1 
 
Fig. 5c: Trust level against varying user utility when the provider has a 
weight of 1 
B. SaaS usage scenario 
We now show the applicability of the trust management 
system in the case of a SaaS usage scenario. The only 
difference of the two processes is only in the pseudo SLA 
templates. Table 4 shows a pseudo SLA template for SaaS. 
Table 3:  pSLA for SaaS  
Attribute value types 
Service Identification Service ID &category ID 
Service Type / category SaaS & category ID 
Availability 50 % uptime 
Service support No 
Service support type N/A 
Maintenance notification Yes 
SLA dependencies {} 
Service location {} 
Security None 
Data encryption None 
Privacy None 
Certification {} 
Performance (Throughput) 1Kbps 
Performance(Response time) 5sec 
The user’s utility increases monotonically with availability 
above 85% and response time below 2sec
( ) { ,sec , _ }sc iR t availability urity response time=   
1) sSLA created from pSLA  
A service provider may accept this pSLA to create the 
sSLA for the service.   
2) rSLA created from sSLA or pSLA 
A service user may accept this sSLA in order to use the 
service or request for additional requirements in its rSLA.   
The computation of the trust values follow the same process 
as is in the case of the IaaS above. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has looked at the design of a trust management 
system for OCS platforms. It has modeled trust for the OCS 
platform, designed a trust management system for OCS 
platforms, and verified the trust model and the trust 
management system through the simulation of the computation 
of the trust values with IaaS, and SaaS examples.  
Even though our trust management systems contain the 
complete elements, we have focused mainly of the modeling of 
trust for the OCS platforms and the trust analysis components 
in our architecture. The other aspects require further work in 
terms of the implementation of the data monitoring and data 
management components. Secondly the decision support 
system and usability of the pseudo SLA templates in the system 
needs some further work for their verification. These further 
works will also require verifying the robustness and scalability 
of the trust management system.  
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